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2The study of NATO’s discourse during the crises in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Crimea offers a possibility to analyse the way NATO presents itself and influences its
identity. By means of a discourse analysis of NATO’s published texts during these two
crises, this thesis will elaborate on the role discourse has played in the shaping of
NATO’s identity. This thesis will show that the identity presented by NATO is that of
an organisation that is mainly concerned with international norms and values.
However, when confronted with a perceived threat by Russia to the organisation
itself, this identity also includes an emphasis on the military background of the
organisation, which responds to a foreign threat. The identity of NATO is thus more
nuanced than frequently described and lies in the middle of the two identities that
are most often attributed to NATO by the existing literature.
Introduction
“The crisis shows us more clearly than ever that defence matters… And that the cooperation between
the two shores of the Atlantic is the best and most natural way to keep ourselves secure”.1 The
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
responded to the crisis in Ukraine emphasising the urgency of cooperation between the members of
NATO. After the Cold War, NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with
Russia. However, the current crises in Ukraine and the previous crisis in Georgia have influenced this
relationship negatively. According to NATO, Russia has violated international law and breached the
trust on which the cooperation between the organisation and Russia has been based. NATO has,
therefore, decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between the two.2 This
leads to questions about the role of NATO in international politics. More specifically, how NATO
perceives its role and wants others to see it.
Most of the research on NATO has been inspired by the endurance of the organisation after the Cold
War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. NATO was thought to be in an identity crisis, because
the main reason to join the organisation, the Soviet threat, had disappeared (e.g. Betts 2009, Ciută
2002, Lübkemeier 1990, Sjursen 2004 and Waterman, Zagorcheva and Reiter 2001.2002). In order to
explain the endurance of NATO, many researchers turned to constructivist approaches. According to
them, NATO was no longer or had never been only a military alliance. The shared norms, values and
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no longer based only on its military capabilities, but on its democratic and liberalist norms and values
as well (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995, Sjursen 2004, Betts 2009, Adler 2008, Davis 2010 and Flockhart).
Taking these different definitions into account, the way identities are founded needs to be discussed.
Literature on identity formation goes back to social psychology. Identities are mostly made in
comparison to others. When identifying characteristics of someone or something else, one’s own
characteristics become clear as well (Hegel 1977, Neumann 1996). Following this line of thinking into
international relations, the identity of a state is formed against an external threat. Therefore, fear
and danger are very much a means to create a certain discourse and identity (Campbell 1998). In the
case of NATO this would mean that in situations where there is an external threat, the identity of the
organisation is formed opposite to this threat. The reaction of NATO to the actions of Russia in
response to the crises in the Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, will be used as case studies to test
these theories. In what way has Russia been portrayed as an external threat in order to internalise
certain characteristics of NATO? Furthermore, in what way does this correspond to the identities that
researchers have attributed to the organisation? Therefore, the research question that this thesis will
discuss is: In what way has NATO presented its identity during the crises in Crimea in Ukraine and in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia? This thesis will in this way fill a gap in the literature
concerning the identity formation of modern-day NATO as the organisation is faced with a Russian
threat once again.
This thesis will go about this by firstly exploring the existing literature on identity formation and in
particular on the identity of NATO. This will provide a basis for the research that follows. It will focus
on the literature concerning the formation of identities and will provide an overview of the research
on the identity of NATO. By means of a discourse analysis of press releases, speeches, transcripts of
press conferences and news by NATO on the crises in the Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this
thesis will discuss the way the organisation framed the discourse to define its own identity.
Therefore, the execution of this research will be set out by means of a short discussion of discourse
analysis and the case studies. Furthermore, the way these texts will be analysed is discussed in detail.
The analysis provides an overview of the concepts NATO finds important to emphasise. The violation
of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the countries in crisis appear to be the main
explanations for the behaviour of NATO. This leads to NATO mainly being regarded as a community
of shared norms and values. However, the identity of NATO does appear to be more balanced than
that. When NATO is confronted with a perceived threat to the organisation by the actions of Russia,
they refer back to the military background of the organisation. Thus, the identity of NATO is more
4nuanced than often described and lies somewhere in the middle of the two identities that are
attributed to NATO by the existing literature.
Literature Review
Against the backdrop Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine, in 2008 and 2014, it is worth to re-
examine the descriptions that have already been made on the identity of NATO. The following
exploration of the literature, results in a clear overview of the existing knowledge on identity
formation, and more specifically NATO’s identity formation. Furthermore, it attempts to fill the
remaining gaps in the literature, concerning the reaction of current-day NATO to Russian military
actions.
The formation of identities
Research on the formation of identities is originally part of social psychology. This is not strange as
identity has a lot to do with the relations between people. According to Gibson and Somers, identity
is created within a specific time, space and in relation to others. People and institutions form
identities by means of situating themselves within a certain narrative and in relation to others (1993,
p.3-5). The narrative is based on ideas of ‘Self and Other’. The question of identity formation and the
concepts of ‘Self and Other’ were specifically related to each other by Hegel. He stated that by
knowing the other, the self can decide whether or not he relates to that (Hegel 1977, p.112). An
accent is placed on the similarities and differences between the self and the other (Neumann 1996,
p.144). According to Neumann the first to introduce this kind of analysis into the field of international
relations was James Der Derian with his book ‘On Diplomacy, a genealogy of western estrangement’.
Instead of having people define who they are opposite to others, Der Derian’s analysis focused on
states and their ways of estrangement (Der Derian 1987, p.1-29). A second theorist that can be
identified as one of the first to use the self/other dichotomy in international relations was Michael J.
Shapiro. Shapiro mainly focussed on the way the dichotomy was useful for questions of war and
peace. Wartime is the moment where the other is obvious, which makes one’s own identity also
distinct. Thus, war emerges as a way to produce, maintain, and reproduce identity (Shapiro 1992,
p.109-110).
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policy should not be seen as a bridge between pre-existing states with secure identities. State
identities are not stable; they cannot exist on their own. Rather, international relations is concerned
with the establishment of boundaries, by means of making some events and actors foreign. Only
when what is foreign is identified, it becomes clear what is domestic (Campbell 1998, p.61-62).
Therefore, dilemmas in international politics are often threats to the identity of the state. The threats
are considered to be foreign, because it is the domestic that is under attack. By placing these treats
outside of the domestic, they can be understood as serving a particular interpretive and political
function. It is easier to believe that threats come from a foreign and anarchical world, than that they
come from the sovereign, well-ordered and rational domestic world (p.63). The dichotomies of us
versus them, self versus other, domestic versus foreign and sovereignty versus anarchy, all serve the
same purpose: to define one’s own identity. For a norm to be a meaningful identity category the
existence of a logical opposite is necessary, in this case that of anarchy and sovereignty (Rumelili
2004, p.31).
An external threat
Consequently, the identity of the state is formed in reference to an external threat. Campbell
identifies state identity as: ‘the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to
secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and
located on the “outside”’ (1998, p.69). Therefore, the identity of the state is often constructed by
means of discourses of fear and danger. However, even when the identity is based on a constructed
narrative of the other, it cannot be wholly fictive. Ongoing events must be continually integrated in
the narrative. Therefore, the discourse must be based on truth, it cannot simple be made up for the
sake of identity. However, the events can be framed (Flockhart 2012, p.82). This leads to a foreign
policy that is concerned with the reproduction of the unstable identity and the containment of the
threats to that identity (Campbell 1998, p.71-78). In the case of collective identities such as that of
NATO, certain states can see the collective as an extension of self. The collective is the domestic. The
construction of difference remains integral to the production of the collective identity, as if it was a
state (Rumelili 2004, p.32).
Thus, danger and fear are a way to redefine or reproduce state identity. An example of this is the
United States (US) during the Cold War. The way the danger of communism and the Soviet Union was
interpreted, replicated US identity when threatened. The Soviet threat provided a framework for US
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discussed, but it would entail references to the American culture as well. For instance, these texts
would begin with a reference to the American culture, ideology or another general reflection, before
discussing the Soviet threat (Campbell 1998, p.137-138). This is a clear way of juxtaposing the other
and the self, the foreign and the domestic. Emphasis is placed on the goodness of one’s own culture
and ideology and opposite to this is the negative interpretation of the other. Therefore, otherness is
very much a part of the creation of an identity. Moreover, the Cold War can be seen as a struggle
related to the production and reproduction of identity (p.169). Before the Cold War, the role of the
US in the world was unclear. By opposing its nature against that of the Soviet Union this identity was
made clear, it was based on culture and democratic ideology (Nathanson 1988, p.444). As long as the
other remains the same, the contradistinction does not change, and therefore the identity of a state
is stable. Thus, during the Cold War the contradistinction was very stable. For the Soviet Union the
other was the US or “the West” and for the US the anarchical other was the Soviet Union. However,
when the Cold War ended this also meant the end for the stability of these identities (Campbell
1998, p.169).
The identity of NATO
As the Soviet threat disappeared, not only the stability of the US identity was brought into question,
but NATO’s as well. It became unclear what NATO is and what it does (Ciută 2002, p.35). It was the
threat of the emerging Soviet Bloc that led five West European countries to sign the Brussels Treaty
on ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence’, on 17 March 1948. This
was followed a year later by the creation of NATO. The five West European countries that signed the
Brussels Treaty were joined by the United States, Canada and five more European countries. Military
cooperation was seen as the only right way to deal with the Russian threat (Bailes 1999, p.305). This
idea seemed to have been proven right. It is thought that by being prepared to defend its members
and if necessary retaliate against the Soviet Union, NATO has prevented World War III during the
Cold War. The purely defensive posture of NATO had been enough to end the war with a loss for the
Soviet Union (Betts 2009, p.31-32). By being successful in its deterioration of the Soviet threat,
NATO’s goals had been reached and its dissolution was thought to be near (Lübkemeier 1990, p.30).
It was no longer in the security interests of the members to continue their military cooperation.
Furthermore, according to alliance theorists, military alliances are always founded against an enemy,
never to achieve something else. This definition of the identity of a military alliance does not leave
room for a military alliance to continue after the threat of the other has dissolved (Ciută 2002, p.39).
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their obligations towards NATO. However, regardless of these assumptions and predictions NATO
remained to exist. This led academics to redefine the actions of the alliance and its identity.
In order to be able to explain NATO’s role and identity after the Cold War, many researchers turned
to constructivist approaches. Based on these approaches they suggested it was necessary to take
into account the role of principles, identity, norms and values. This led many to not see NATO as a
military alliance, but as a community of liberal and democratic norms and values as well (Sjursen
2004, p.687). Betts, for example, states that NATO also had a purpose of serving as a diplomatic
vehicle for transatlantic political unity (2009, p.32). Risse-Kappen goes even further, by stating that it
was not even the Soviet threat that led to the creation of NATO. According to him the Soviet threat
only strengthened the sense of a common purpose among the allies. The origins can be found in the
wartime alliance of France, the United Kingdom and the US. This alliance led to a sense of community
and common values, and more specifically the focus on democracy (1995, p.223). By seeing NATO as
more than a military alliance, researchers were able to explain its endurance.
Not only was its endurance explained, but also its actions after the Cold War NATO’s enlargement
program is seen as an implementation of the liberal values that are a part of the organisation’s
identity. It made sense that new partners were inducted into a community of shared values (Adler
2008, p.213). According to Adler, NATO was able to transform itself by adopting a sense of
community and joint enterprise, which was based on ideational and material resources and by
partially adopting cooperative-security knowledge and practices. For these new partners it made
sense to join NATO, because they faced serious economic, social and political problems. NATO could
provide them with support to counter these problems. Furthermore, some of these states still faced
military and economic threats from Russia. Membership of NATO might juxtapose that threat and
Western organisations might help them resist the Russians (Waterman, Zagorcheva and Reiter
2001/2002, p.222). In this sense the enlargement of NATO was a positive situation for both parties.
This strand of literature argues that the main incentives for NATO’s enlargement were the shared
liberal democratic values and norms. This common identity of the alliance members led to a focus on
democracy promotion. The new identity of the organisation was one that grants membership on the
basis of political assessments and democratic principles, instead of the capability to contribute
militarily to the security of its members (Sjursen 2004,p.689-690). Furthermore, NATO even stated in
the preamble of the founding treaty that the parties are ‘determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law’.3 Its actions following the end of the Cold War show a focus on these
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of protecting its member states from an identified external threat. Furthermore, there is evidence
that the identity of the organisation is somehow linked to the idea of democratic governance.
However, one must wonder if this means that democracy is the core identifier for the identity of
NATO (Sjursen 2004, p.693). Furthermore, the current strategic concept of NATO takes other threats
into account as well. It is the spread of unconventional challenges, such as mass migration and
organised crime, which are now on the agenda as well. This leads to new actions by the organisation;
its purely defensive attitude has made room for a more proactive posture (Davis 2010, p.36). NATO
has been involved in demanding missions such as Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Gulf of Aden. Such
missions were not on the agenda during the Cold War (Flockhart 2012, p.79). By examining the
attitude of NATO in response to the crises in Georgia and the Ukraine this thesis will question the
conclusion that the identity of NATO is mainly based on the concept of liberal democratic values and
norms.
This literature review has discussed the existing literature concerning the way state identities are
shaped. It has set out how an opposite is needed to create the identity of the ‘self’. More specifically,
the literature on NATO’s identity has gone through a great change. Firstly it described NATO as a
military organisation, however, this changed into a description of NATO as a community of states
with common norms and values. However, the literature does not discuss the identity of NATO
during its involvement in other international crises. The crises in Georgia and Ukraine provide an
interesting case study to challenge NATO’s perceived identity as a community of common norms and
values. The involvement of Russia in these conflicts is proving to become one of the biggest and most
recent international disagreements between Russia and NATO. When confronted with Russia as the
opposition again, what type of identity will NATO want to present of itself and Russia? This is where
this thesis will contribute to the existing literature.
Methodology and Analysis
The literature review has made clear that identity is formed by juxtaposing oneself against the other.
Furthermore, states do not have an ontological status apart from their acts; these constitute their
reality. Thus, the status of an international organisation as a sovereign actor is produced by a
discourse of a principal and stable identity. The identity of an international organisation is created by
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the importance of acts in the formation of the identity of NATO. By means of a discourse analysis, the
way NATO has juxtaposed itself against Russia’s recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine will be set out.
Therefore, this section will firstly discuss discourse analysis as a method. Furthermore, this chapter
will provide a justification for the case studies chosen and the sources used. Finally, the actual
analysis of these sources will be discussed.
Discourse analysis
The perception of an object, a person, a state or an international organisation is socially reproduced.
Putting these perceptions forward time after time, leads them to become a set of statements and
practices. Moreover, certain language becomes institutionalised and normalised over time. This
institutionalised discourse is at the centre of discourse analysis. Discourse constrains how the world
is viewed by people and thus how the world is ordered. By influencing the discourse, people, states
and international organisations are able to influence how they are viewed (Neumann 2008, p.61-62).
For states, identity is of great importance. National states or international organisations do not
possess pre-discursive and stable identities. However, their legitimacy is based on such an identity.
Thus, to contain the challenges to the state’s representation, the state attempts to fixate its identity
(Campbell 1998, p.12). Discourse analysis focuses on the way discourse is used to create a certain
form of reality, in this case a certain identity.
Discourse analysis is most associated with the works of the French philosopher and sociologist Michel
Foucault. Foucault initiated the concept that truth is created by the ideas that society creates and
formulates about the world (Schneider 2008, p.1-2). Through time, discourse analysis has evolved
and become a method that focuses on communication practices that systematically form the
subjects and objects of which they speak (Jäger 2004, p.116). Discourse is not only influenced by
society, it also shapes or constitutes society itself (Schneider 2008, p.3). Discourse studies are
organised through a set of theoretical commitments. Among the most important of these are the
following three analytically distinguishable groups of theoretical claims. The first commitment is to a
concept of discourse as systems of signification. That is, people construct the meaning and reality of
things, by means of, for instance, linguistics. The second commitment is that discourses are seen as
productive of things defined by the discourse. Discourses make the ways of being in, and acting
towards the world clear. Furthermore, it shows the operationalisation of a ‘regime of truth’, while
excluding other possible modes of identity. For instance, it shows who is authorised to speak and act
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and who is not. Thus, discourses define and enable certain knowledge; they endorse a common
sense. The third commitment of discourse analysis is the play of practice. As identity and knowledge
are not fixed, this requires them to be emphasised and reemphasised. Discourses are changeable and
contingent upon history. Thus, identities are only partially fixed and discourse therefore adapts to
the context (Milliken 1999, p.229-230). In this case, the discourse of NATO will adapt to the two
crises and its identity will be formed.
Case studies – Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, and Crimea
The crises this thesis focuses on are those in Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Crimea. As Rasmussen
himself said, these crises challenge the organisation. More specifically, these crises challenge the
identity of NATO. Once again NATO is confronted with a Russian military threat as it is militarily
involved in neighbouring areas. This refers back to the first identity attributed to NATO: that of a
military organisation. Furthermore, these crises also concern liberal democratic values of NATO, as
Russia incorporates sovereign territory of other states. The two case studies will be used to analyse if
there is a pattern in the way NATO responds to situations in which it is confronted with a Russian
threat. The comparison between the case studies will result in a description of the possible causes of
differences in the response of NATO concerning its identity when it is confronted with a Russian
threat. The response of NATO to the crises might lead to conclude that the response of NATO is
different when it concerns a Russian threat. Furthermore, it might lead to conclude that other factors
influence NATO’s presented identity more than the Russian involvement in the conflicts. The two
analysed cases will be described hereafter to provide the background information needed for the
analysis of the results.
The first case this thesis focuses on is the Russian-Georgian war. This was the first time since the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that Russia sent armed military troops into foreign territory. On 7
August 2008, fighting broke out between Georgian military and the local armed forces in Tskhinvali.
This led to hundreds of deaths, including 12 Russian peacekeepers (Turner 2011, p.50). According to
an EU-sponsored report, it was Georgia that attacked South Ossetia first, which led to a quick
response of the Russians (Karagiannis 2013, p.74). Russian troops arrived in the capital, and the
fighting continued for four more days. On Monday the 11th, both houses of the Russian parliament
decided to recognise the independence of South Ossetia as well as that of Abkhazia. Russia did agree
to a ceasefire the next day. Therefore, this war is known as “the five day war”. The war seemed to
have come to an end with the ceasefire (Turner 2011, p.50-51). However, on 26 August 2008, Russia
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officially recognised the independence of these two republics. Furthermore, Russia was slow to abide
by the terms of the ceasefire. A second implementation agreement was needed before Russia finally
withdrew its forces from Georgia on 8 October. Russia’s actions in Georgia were highly condemned
by the international community, including its ally China (Bowker 2011, p.198). A vast majority of the
countries in the world does not recognise the independence of the two regions. Thus, they are still
considered to be a part of the sovereign territory of Georgia. A side effect of the war was that it
stopped further NATO enlargement towards the East. A future Georgian accession to NATO seems to
be ruled out, because few members are willing to issue security guarantees to unstable and
geopolitically exposed states which could lead to conflict with Russia (Larsen 2012, p.103).
The second case study, the crisis in Crimea, is part of a larger crisis in Ukraine. As this thesis is
written, there is still unrest in the eastern regions of the country. This thesis will not include this
aspect of the crisis as it is still ongoing at the time of writing. The crisis in Ukraine started when the
cabinet of President Yanukovych abandoned a trade agreement with the EU and sought after closer
cooperation with Russia. Mass demonstrations in Kiev turned into violent encounters between the
protesters and government forces. On the 21 February President Yanukovych signed a compromise
deal with opposition leaders, but fled the country the next day. The following days an interim
government was presented. However, on 27 and 28 February pro-Russian gunmen took over key
buildings in the Crimean capitol, Simferopol and the main airport of the region. On 6 March the
parliament of Crimea voted to join Russia and schedules a referendum to be held on 16 March.
Russia declared that it would support Crimea if the region would vote to leave Ukraine and join
Russia. At the same time Western states warned Russia for new measures if it does not withdraw its
forces from Ukraine. However, on the 16 March the secession referendum was won by the pro-
Russians with a force majeure. As promised, Putin signed a bill to absorb the region into the Russian
Federation. The EU responded by condemning the annexation and extending the list of individuals
targeted for sanctions. This crisis was followed by a build-up of Russian forces on the eastern border
of Ukraine and secessionist movements in this areas.4
The sources that will be analysed are press releases, speeches, transcripts of press conferences and
news published by NATO during these two crises. This research only focuses on texts published by
NATO itself, because it is concerned with the identity that NATO wants to propagate outwards.
Furthermore, the analysed sources are further contained by the case studies. Only the press releases,
speeches, transcripts and news published during these crises are analysed. In the case of the crises in
Georgia this concerns all discourse from the 16 April to 26 august. On 16 April President Vladimir
Putin of Russia signed a decree authorising direct official relations between the Russian government
and the secessionist authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This date is considered to be the start
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of Russia’s open involvement in the secessionist regions of Georgia. On 26 August, Russia recognised
the independence of these two republics. Therefore, this is seen as the end of the main
confrontation between Georgian and Russian military. During this period, 18 press releases,
speeches, news and transcripts of press conferences were published. These 18 texts will be analysed.
In the case of the crisis in the Crimea this thesis will analyse all texts published between 27 February
and 24 March. On 27 February Pro-Russian gunmen seized key buildings in Simferopol, the Crimean
capital. This was followed by the sending of Russian forces to protect Russian civilian on 1 March. The
end of the main confrontation is defined to be on 24 March when Ukrainian troops leave Crimea
after the absorption of Crimea into Russia. In this period NATO has published 15 texts in which it
responds to the crisis. These will be analysed in the next chapter of this thesis.
Discussion of analysis
For the analysis of these responses, this thesis follows the five-step framework suggested by Jäger.
This method is used because it provides a clear framework. This makes this research better to
reproduce and, thus, better to verify. This framework suggests to first analyse the institutional
context. This step entails defining the medium, the author, the public and possible events that the
discourse refers to. Thus, this first step provides the background information that might have
influenced the discourse. Secondly, the text surface is analysed. This includes an analysis of the
graphical configurations of the product, for instance the headlines (Jäger 2004, p.175). These first
two steps have mainly been preparatory work for the next two phases. The analysis of linguistic and
rhetoric tools is the core of the discourse analysis. This step will include examination of the
arguments, the logical composition of the argument, conclusions, as well as rhetorical figures. The
style of the discourse is analysed as well, for instance, protagonists and antagonists, vocabulary and
modality (p.275-328). Thus, this phase focuses on what the different elements of the text mean and
how they formulate the identity of NATO. The forth step in this discourse analysis takes a step back
from the textual analysis and looks at the content and discursive positions expressed in the texts. The
fifth step is the formulation of a final conclusion. The preceding four steps should have led to a
coherent description and interpretation of the texts concerning the Russian involvement in Abkhazia,
South-Ossetia and Crimea. Furthermore, this will lead to an analysis of the way NATO sees itself, and
wants others to identify them (p.175). A second benefit of this research method is that the five steps
lead to a complete analysis of the discourse. This method not only looks at the vocabulary used, but
also at the arguments used, the conclusions drawn, as well as events that might have influenced the
discourse . This leads to a complete overview of the discourse which is the aim of this thesis.
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In order to be able to generalise the conclusions of this analysis, more case studies should be
included in future analysis. Furthermore, discourse analysis is inherently biased, as it is the
researchers’ interpretation of the discourse. In this thesis the bias is attempted to be kept at
minimum, by looking as objectively as possible to the analysed discourse. In order to exclude the
possibility of a bias, this research should be repeated by several other researchers. The used
framework should make it possible to be reproduced. However, one should take these weaknesses
inherent to the approach into consideration when drawing conclusions.
Results
The previous sections have outlined the basis for this research. The literature review has made clear
that identity can be formed through juxtaposing oneself against another. Furthermore, the repetition
of certain acts or views creates the identity of an international organisation. As outlined in the last
section, the five-step plan of Jäger is used for the analysis of the way NATO formed its identity during
the crises in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. Subsequently, an overview of the results of this
analysis will now be given. It will do so by describing the results for the case of Abkhazia, followed by
a description of the results for Crimea. For each case, the arguments and vocabulary used, and the
conclusions drawn will be set out. In the fourth step of the plan of Jäger the content and the
discursive positions are analysed. These results will be presented as well as the use of certain
concepts in the texts. Moreover, this analysis will take the changing circumstances during the crises
into account. The rhetoric of NATO might have changed as events took place. Finally the conclusion
will state that NATO has used similar arguments and conclusions in both cases. These mainly focus on
the illegitimate nature of the Russian acts. However, there remain some differences. The main
difference concerns the way NATO perceives Russia’s actions to be a threat to the organisation in
Crimea, but not in Georgia. These identities will be compared to the identities attributed to NATO in
the existing literature.
NATO on Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Firstly, the arguments that were used in the press releases, speeches, press conferences and news
items will be discussed. Within these texts a number of arguments were regularly used. Furthermore,
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the arguments changed tone, as the conflict endured and intensified. From the beginning of the
conflict the Secretary General of the NATO had amplified the importance of the territorial integrity,
independence and sovereignty for NATO. In his statement of 16 April 2008, the Secretary General
states that the Russian steps undermine that sovereignty. He finds that the Russian Federation
should reverse the measures they have taken, the establishment of legal links with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.5 The three concepts of territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Georgia
remain the most important arguments for NATO to condemn the Russian actions. On the 12th of
August, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in a press point following the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia:
It is also clear that allies reiterated in very strong terms the full respect necessary for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. And it is more than a phrase in a period of
time where that territorial integrity is not respected by Russia.6
Thus NATO places emphasis on the importance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
independence of Georgia throughout the entire conflict.
A second argument that is recurrent throughout the analysed texts is the illegality of the Russian
actions in Georgia. Not only does NATO focus on the breach of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity, it also mentions the illegality of the specific acts of Russia. The Secretary General for
instance responded to the deployment of Russian Railway troops: ‘This deployment of Russian
Railroad Forces does not appear to have any legal basis; it is not taking place in the context of the CIS
peacekeeping mission, and it is against the express wishes of the Georgian Government’.7 He again
mentions this in a press point on the 12th of august. He then states:
I do not think, quite honestly, that the bombardments we have seen, the naval blockade we
have seen, the massive use of force by the Russians we have seen, is in conformity with the
CIS peacekeeping mandate. I do not think that that has much to do with peacekeeping, quite
honestly.8
Again he mentions that the military actions by the Russians do not match with the CIS peacekeeping
mandate. When the Russians recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia at the end of the conflict, the
Secretary General responds by arguing that this recognition is a direct violation of numerous UN
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Security council resolutions regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, it is mentioned
multiple times that Russia itself endorsed these resolutions. These arguments are used to call on
Russia to respect the Georgian sovereignty and to stop its military actions in the country.
A third argument that is made throughout the texts concerns NATO’s support for Georgia. Georgia is
often mentioned as a friend or a partner of NATO. During the press conference of 12 August a
question was raised concerning the involvement of NATO in the conflict. De Hoop Scheffer answered
that:
It does matter to NATO, first of all, because Georgia is a highly respected Partner of NATO, is
a friend of NATO, has Intensified Dialogue with NATO. Georgia has applied for the
Membership Action Plan. That decision has not been taken, but the Allies have said that one
day Georgia will join NATO. In that regard, such a massive conflict with another nation
coming into territory of Georgia proper, not only the disputed areas of Abkhazia and Ossetia,
but also coming into Georgia proper, and using excessive force, is of direct relevance to NATO.
We owe that to our PfP partners.9
This quote clearly shows the standpoint of NATO regarding its relationship with Georgia. Even though
the country is not a member state of the Alliance, it is considered an important ally and, therefore,
NATO will support Georgia in this crisis.
These arguments have led NATO to draw several conclusions concerning the crisis in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. The main conclusion that NATO has drawn from the beginning of the crisis until the
end is that it supports the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and independence of Georgia. NATO
has urged the Russians to do the same throughout the crisis. For instance at the weekly press briefing
by the NATO spokesman on 30 April he said:
I want to state very clearly and very firmly that the allies are unanimous in supporting,
endorsing, Georgia’s territorial integrity and will not recognize or support steps that
undermine that sovereignty, be they explicit recognition or other steps which, if not, de jure,
de facto undermine that sovereignty.10
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NATO has reiterated its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. At
the end of the conflict the foreign ministers met in a special session of the North Atlantic Council to
re-affirm their support for these principles.11
Secondly, NATO has made clear in its discourse that the actions of Russia have consequences. In the
earlier responses to the crisis, NATO calls on Russia to reverse the measures they have taken. This is
followed by a call to de-escalate tensions and open dialogue on a high level. However, towards the
end of the crisis, NATO’s tone changes. NATO concludes that it cannot continue with business as
usual. The Secretary General stated on 19 august:
I think there can be no business as usual with Russia under present circumstances. And the
future of our relations will depend on the concrete actions Russia will take to honour the
words of President Medvedev… But I should add that we do certainly not have the intention
to close all doors in our communication with Russia.12
These conclusions are the result of the argument of NATO that the Russian actions in Georgia are
illegal and in breach of Georgia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
The vocabulary used places emphasis in these arguments and conclusions. For instance, NATO often
used the word ‘reiterate’ when it concerned their expression of support for the Georgian
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Furthermore, Georgia is described by NATO as a
valued friend, an ally or long-standing partner throughout the texts.13 This description endorses the
support of NATO for Georgia in this crisis. This is further underlined by the way NATO describes South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has referred to these as the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Georgian
region of South Ossetia.14 By describing the regions as part of Georgia, NATO makes clear that it sees
them as an integral part of Georgia and, thus, stresses the breach of sovereignty by Russia. The
vocabulary used by NATO also emphasises the opinion of NATO on the use of force by Russia. NATO
describes this as disproportionate, massive, excessive and inconsistent with its role.15 These
adjectives all show a value judgement of the actions of Russia.
What does this discourse analysis say about the way NATO presents itself and creates an identity? It
is interesting to see that the main arguments used and conclusions drawn by NATO are based on
concepts such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, international law and the international recognised
independence of Georgia. NATO finds that the actions of Russia in Georgia are illegal, because it
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violates the sovereignty territorial integrity and independence of Georgia. Moreover, the specific
actions of Russia are considered to be in conformity with a peacekeeping mandate. Furthermore, the
use of force is described as disproportionate and excessive. The emphasis of NATO on these concepts
within this crisis situation shows what NATO finds important to stress. Therefore, this also says
something about the identity of NATO. The arguments and conclusions of NATO do not seem to
correspond with the identity of NATO during the Cold War. NATO does not only focus on the external
threat of Russia. It mentions Russia and its actions, however, not as a direct threat. The more
constructive approach to the identity of NATO appears to match the discourse of NATO in this crisis
better. This approach takes into account liberal and democratic norms and values. The emphasis of
NATO on sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law does correspond with this
description.
NATO on Crimea
That being said, to what extent does this identity also apply to NATO during the crisis in Crimea? As
mentioned in the literature review, identity is created within a specific time, space and in relation to
others.  In this case, Russia remains the opposite to which the identity of NATO is formed. However,
time has changed and the specific situation in Crimea was different from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Therefore, the same analysis as before will be executed. This will supply us with an idea of the
subjects of importance to NATO, the emphasis they place on certain acts and the reasoning they use.
Furthermore, the two cases will be compared. Has NATO been consistent in the identity it expresses
or does this depend on the situation?
Firstly, let us begin by discussing the arguments used by NATO in their responses to the Russian acts
in Crimea. Several arguments were put forward in response to the crisis in Crimea. Firstly, NATO
focuses on the choices the Ukrainian people made. From the beginning of the crisis, NATO has given
its support for the path of democratic and inclusive reforms taken by the Ukrainians.16 Throughout
the crisis, NATO emphasises the fact that only the Ukrainians can determine their country’s future.
NATO stands by their right to choose. Moreover NATO focuses on the democratic aspirations of the
Ukrainians. As it is their decision to democratise, that should be respected. For instance, on 6 March
the Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, states in a press point: ‘We stress the importance of
an inclusive political process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and
the rule of law, which fulfils the democratic aspirations of the entire Ukrainian people’.17 In this quote
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the Secretary General discusses both the ambition of the Ukrainians to democratise and the
importance of an inclusive political process for NATO.
The inclusive political process that Rasmussen mentions is based on democratic values, respect for
human rights, minorities and the rule of law. These concepts are used throughout the discourse as a
response to the Russian actions. NATO emphasised that contrary to repeated calls by the
international community, Russia continued to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Ukraine. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are placed at the centre of the
argumentation. The Secretary General has stated that: ‘NATO stands by Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and by the fundamental principles of international law’.18 Furthermore, Russia is
seen to violate its international commitments. Thus, the focus lies on the adherence to the rule of
law. This line of argumentation was also used when a referendum was held on the accession of
Crimea to the Russian Federation. This referendum was argued to be illegal and illegitimate. The
circumstances under which the referendum was held were considered to be deeply flawed and thus
unacceptable. Moreover, the Secretary General stated: ‘the so-called referendum undermined
international efforts to find a peaceful and political solution to the Ukraine crisis and violated the
Ukrainian constitution and international law’.19 Again NATO focussed on the way the referendum
violated the rule of law, Ukrainian and international. Furthermore, it is emphasised throughout the
discourse that the referendum undermines the international efforts for a political solution to the
crisis, besides being illegal and illegitimate.
Interestingly, a final recurrent argument that is made concerns the implications of the Russian
actions in Crimea. According to NATO these actions not only have implications for Ukraine, but for
the entire Euro-Atlantic area. The stability and security of the whole area is threatened. According to
the Secretary General: ‘We clearly face the gravest threat to European security since the end of the
Cold War’.20 The sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity are considered to be key
factors to the security and stability of the entire region. Therefore, the support of NATO for Ukraine
and its engagement with its political and military leadership is strengthened. The Russian acts are
thus not only considered to be in violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also
to endanger the stability and security of the entire region. Making them a grave threat to European
security, and thus important to NATO.
These arguments have led NATO to draw several conclusions. At the beginning of the conflict NATO
urged the new Ukrainian leadership to continue its efforts to establish an inclusive political process.
Furthermore, all parties were urged to step back from confrontation and to refrain from provocative
actions. The path of dialogue is suggested as the best means to achieve a solution to the crisis.21
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NATO continued to support the constructive efforts for a peaceful solution to the crisis. However, as
the crisis progressed, NATO shifted its conclusions from both parties to mainly urging Russia not to
continue its actions. On 6 march the Secretary General concluded: ‘We call on Russia to honour its
international commitments and halt the military escalation in Crimea, we call on Russia to withdraw
its forces to their bases, and to refrain from any interference elsewhere in Ukraine’.22
When Russia moves to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation, NATO strongly condemns this
act and concludes that there is no justification to continue on this course and that this can only
deepen the international isolation of Russia.23 Eventually Russia’s actions lead NATO to draw
conclusions condemning the Alliance itself. On 21 March the Secretary General delivered a speech at
the Brussels Forum and set out three priorities which he urged Allies to address in the wake of the
crisis: ‘to reaffirm Allied commitment to collective defence, strengthen support for Ukraine and the
wider region, and to make clear that we can no longer do business as usual with Russia’.
Furthermore, Rasmussen considered the September NATO Summit key for allies to ensure that they
have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat.24 It is clear that the
conclusions drawn by NATO have changed as the crisis endured. They have changed from urging both
the Ukrainian and the Russian governments to refrain from violence and return to the path of
dialogue, to condemning the Russian actions and considering these as a threat to the entire region
and to NATO.
A second conclusion apparent in NATO’s discourse is its support for the Ukrainian sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Furthermore, NATO concludes that the actions of Russia breach international
commitments and international law. Thus, NATO focuses again on specific norms and values. NATO’s
commitment to these concepts is clear in this quote from a news item published by NATO:
The discussions showed the convergence of views in both organisations in upholding
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for a dialogue between Ukraine and
Russia as well as de-escalating steps in view of a peaceful solution to the crisis in full respect
of international law as laid down in bi-and multilateral commitments.25
The support of NATO for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is visible throughout the
discourse of NATO. Furthermore, it is concluded that actions of Russia run counter to the principles
of the United Nations Charter and the referendum held in Crimea had no legal effect or political
legitimacy.26
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The vocabulary used supports the arguments made and the conclusions that are drawn. For instance,
it is interesting to see that when discussing the referendum about the Crimean secession to Russia,
NATO talks of the ‘so-called referendum’. This emphasises that NATO considers the referendum to be
illegitimate and illegal.27 Secondly, what is striking about the vocabulary of NATO is that it often
refers to Ukraine as our friend Ukraine, our long-standing partner, an important partner or the
partnership is referred to as excellent. These adjectives accentuate the support of NATO towards
Ukraine. They can also be viewed as arguments for this support, because Ukraine is such a long-
standing partner of NATO, support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity should be given. Finally,
a reoccurrence in the discourse of NATO is a reference to the ‘entire Ukrainian people’. For instance,
NATO refers to the democratic aspirations of the entire country, and of the determination of the
Ukrainian people.28 This use of vocabulary supports the value of democracy that NATO endorses. The
unity of the Ukrainian people is an integral part in the discourse of NATO, in the argumentation of
NATO for its support of the new government.
What does this discourse analysis say about the identity of NATO? Just as in the case of Georgia,
NATO focuses on concepts such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law. The acts of
Russia are condemned as they violate these international norms and values. Furthermore, the
Crimean referendum is considered to be illegal and illegitimate, because it is in violation of
international and Ukrainian law. Thus, it appears that NATO finds these concepts important to
emphasise. Therefore, this says something about the aspects NATO finds important and what it
chooses to put forward. This appears to correspond to the description of NATO as a community of
common liberal democratic norms and values. The norms and values put forward in this case can be
described as liberal democratic. Moreover, NATO focuses on the democratic aspirations of the
Ukrainian people and exerts its support for this. However, in this case NATO also emphasises the
effect of the Russian acts in Ukraine on the Alliance. Rasmussen set out priorities for the Allies of
which one was to reaffirm their commitment to the collective defence. Furthermore, he called on the
Allies to ensure they have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat. These
calls of the Secretary General correspond more with the original goal of NATO, to cooperate in order
to defend against the Soviet treat. Rasmussen appears to use the same rhetoric, namely, that the
Allies need to reaffirm their commitments and ensure that they have enough capabilities to deter
and defend against any threat. The threat of potential instability in the Euro-Atlantic region caused
by the Russian Federation is one that the alliance should be ready to defend against. This very much
resembles the rhetoric used during the Cold War.
Both case studies have provided a view on the rhetoric and arguments used by NATO and the
conclusions that were drawn. These can be used to describe the identity of NATO that the alliance
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wants others to see. In both cases a strong emphasis was placed on the violation of sovereignty,
territorial integrity, independence and international law. However, in the case of Crimea, NATO also
focused on the greater implications of the crisis for the entire region and thus for NATO itself. This
differs from the case of Georgia where NATO remained rather on the surface on the implications for
NATO. Thus, it is not simply the involvement of Russia that leads to a discourse focused on the
military background of the organisation. NATO’s identity appears to depend on the situation. When it
finds that it is being threatened by the actions of another actor, NATO will most likely return to a
discourse that is more related to its identity during the Cold War. The results lead to conclude that
the identity is foremost based on specific norms and values that NATO wants to propagate outwards.
However, when the threat is considered to be directed at the organisation the discourse changes to
one that amplifies its defensive and military roots. This matches the descriptions of identity
formation discussed earlier. Identity if formed within a specific time, space and in relation to others.
Thus, NATO’s identity adapts to the specific time it is in. The literature on the identity of NATO takes
this into account by ascribing NATO a different identity after the end of the Cold War. However, the
literature does not consider that this identity may vary depending on the specific situation. One
cannot speak of the identity of NATO, but should rather discuss its identity on a case to case basis.
Conclusion and Discussion
This thesis opened with a quote of the Secretary General concerning the crisis in Ukraine. This
specific case was the direct reason to look into the way NATO portrays itself and how it wants others
to see the organisation. What NATO finds important to put forward when confronted with a Russian
threat once more has been analysed by means of a discourse analysis. Therefore the research
question of this thesis was: In what way has NATO presented its identity during the crises in the
Crimea in Ukraine and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia? Firstly, the focus was on the way
identities are formed according to the existing literature. This literature review made clear that
identities are created within a specific time, space and in relation to others. Especially the specific
time and the relation with others have proven to be critical. Dichotomies are used to define what the
other is, and what the self is. The other is often considered to be an external threat. In the analysed
case studies, Russia was considered the other and acted opposite to the norms and values of NATO.
During the Cold War the identity of NATO was dominated by a discourse that depicted the Soviet
Union as an enemy. Military cooperation was the main component of the identity of the
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organisation. However, when the Soviet Union fell apart, the main identity of NATO disappeared as
well. Its identity is currently considered to be based upon the liberal and democratic norms and
values of its members. This thesis has analysed whether these descriptions of NATO’s identity still
hold for present-day NATO when the organisation is confronted with Russian military acts.
Three main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the executed discourse analysis. In NATO’s
discourse, dichotomies are used to define what is good and bad. In both cases the actions of Russia
are considered to be a breach of international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
independence of the countries. Russia should abide by the norms and values that are endorsed by
NATO. These norms and values are central to the arguments and dichotomies used and the
conclusions drawn. The emphasis of NATO on these norms and values leads to the first conclusion
that NATO finds these to be the most important to note. As these concepts are important to NATO,
this tells something about the identity NATO wishes to present to the outside. Common norms and
values are thus at the centre of the identity of NATO. This resembles the identity that researchers
and NATO itself credited to the alliance, one that is based on an agreement on norms and values.
However, it is important to note that the analysis of NATO’s discourse concerning Crimea revealed a
second aspect of NATO’s identity. The discourse during this crisis also included references to a threat
to the alliance itself. The Allies are requested to reaffirm their commitment to collective defence. The
dichotomy created is one based on an external threat to the organisation. Thus, a second conclusion
drawn is that NATO created an identity for the alliance during the Crimea crises that was based on a
collective defence against the Russian threat. This is very much similar to the rhetoric and identity
formed used during the Cold War, however, it needs to be acknowledged that the rhetoric during the
Cold War was contained much stronger statements against Russia.
The answer to the research question is, thus, more balanced than only confirming the identity most
researchers accredit to NATO. In these two cases the identity of NATO as a community of shared
norms and values is predominantly brought to the forefront. NATO bases its arguments and
conclusions on the disrespect of Russia for its shared norms and values. However, as became clear in
the case of Crimea, NATO also felt that Russia’s acts were a threat to the alliance. As a result, the
identity of NATO as a military organisation founded against an external threat should not be
disregarded. NATO still is a military defence alliance. The moment NATO is confronted with a military
threat concerning the alliance, this identity appears to return in its discourse. Thus, it is the perceived
threat to the organisation that influenced NATO to focus more on its military background, and not
simply the involvement of Russia. Thirdly, this leads to conclude that the identity of NATO depends
on the specific crisis it responds to. The existing literature on the identity of NATO has not taken this
aspect enough into account. This literature had considered the organisation’s identity to be quite
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stable. However, these results lead to a different conclusion. Even though, the primary identity of
NATO does focus on shared norms and values, the specific identity varies on a case-to-case basis.
When only considering the analysed cases of Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia one can conclude
that the identity presented by NATO is one that mainly focuses on NATO as a community of shared
norms and values. When threatened, this identity included a focus on NATO as a military defence
alliance that defends its members when necessary.
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